


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Chief, S/OM

15 September 1954

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Inadequacies of NSA Exploitation

1. The Inadequacies

Since your terms of reference preclude discussion of the problem from the view of more time or more personnel, I offer the following remarks.

a) This branch, for the most part, has exploited adequately the materials at NSA. The value of the materials is self-evident to the branch analysts. In short, there is neither indifference nor lack of exploitation.

b) If the end result is unsatisfactory it is not because the analysts are not trying. If more effort and time is to be spent at NSA then a basic reconsideration of our functions and responsibilities is in order. We can either reduce our research programs, which seem to be at a minimum now, or, we can reduce the time spent on collateral. This would be foolish for neither NSA nor collateral materials should stand alone as intelligence sources.

2. Remarks on Better Utilization

a) The critics of our efforts should spell out where they think we have failed. It is almost impossible to make constructive suggestions when one is unaware of the reasons for criticism.

b) In the obvious things such as language training, visiting NSA, using the materials, etc, we are doing a good job. One possible way to improve the situation is to get better liaison and improve NSA efforts for the consumer, by keying them in closer with the details of our research programs. This can be done by marking them for a copy of all our PIM's, the direct levying of requirements on the various panels, etc.

c) The research technique of card annotation may be workable for the specialists in a narrow field. It is not too good for those handling many functional responsibilities since they lack the necessary detailed familiarity with each of them.

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d. The indifference spoken about on the part of analysts is confined to only a few. Their identity is usually known, and the obvious solution is to force them to the Hall. Certainly those analysts now making a whole-hearted effort at the Hall can not make up for the deficiencies of those who are allergic to the country air.

e. Full time assignment of analysts to the Hall has the weakness of over-emphasis of one source of intelligence to the neglect of all-source reporting. I see no merit in the de facto transfer of analysts from CIA to NSA.

f. Barring a clarification from our superiors of our failures, it seems to me that in the final analysis, the merit of all our efforts anywhere is in the quality of our final reports. If they are worthwhile then the responsible analyst did his job. If he did not, then let his superiors enforce remedial or corrective action.

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